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I. INTRODUCTION

As a result of climate change, 2014 was the hottest year on record.'
Increasing global temperatures affect environmental and human health
and are being factored into congressional and judicial actions. States,
agencies, and individual citizens are increasingly bringing climate change
related actions to recover for climate change related damage or to compel
regulation in the area. As climate change is a global phenomenon
resulting from global actions, plaintiffs often struggle to establish Article
III standing. This Note first defines standing and then introduces the
science of climate change. This Note then examines the role standing and
* B.A. in Psychology, Phi Beta Kappa, Magna cum laude, College of William & Mary,
2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2016. The Author would like
to thank her family for their love and support.
1. See NASA, NOAA Find 2014 Warmest Year in Modern Record, NASA (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.nasa.gov/press/2015/january/nasa-determines-2014-warmest-year-in-modem-record/#.VP
ybdLPF_-U.
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climate change science have played in several court decisions. Finally,
this Note concludes by analyzing the implications of those decisions for
the future of climate change cases.
II. STANDING

The plaintiff must have Article III standing for a federal court to hear
the plaintiffs case. 2 "At bottom, 'the gist of the question of standing' is
whether petitioners have 'such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination."' 3 Where multiple plaintiffs are joined in a single case, only
one of the plaintiffs needs standing for the court to review the case.4 This
rule comes from the cases and controversies requirement of Article III of
the United States Constitution.5 According to Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildhfe, case law dictates a three-element standing test. 6
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized . .. and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical,"' . . . Second, there must be a causal connection

between the injury and the conduct complained of - the injury has
to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the

defendant, and not ...

th[e] result [of] the independent action of

some third party not before the court." . . . Third, it must be

"likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will
be "redressed by a favorable decision." 7
The burden is on the party who invokes federal jurisdiction to
establish these three elements of standing.8 Thus, in order for the courts
to reach the merits of the plaintiffs' actions in the following cases, at least
one of the plaintiffs needed to have demonstrated that, as a result of the
defendants' action or inaction, the plaintiff suffered a concrete,
particularized and actual injury and that the injury would likely be
2. See Delta Commercial Fisheries Ass'n v. Gulf of Mex. Fishery Mgmt. Council, 364
F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding "[i]f a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, then a federal
court lacks jurisdiction to hear the complaint").
3. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)).
4. Id. at 518.
5. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
6. Id. at 560.
7. Id. at 560-61.
8. Id. at 561.
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redressed by a judgment for the plaintiff.9

III. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE

According to the EPA, "[n]atural processes such as changes in the
sun's energy, shifts in ocean currents, and others affect Earth's climate.
However, they do not explain the warming that we have observed over
the last half-century."o Instead, greenhouse gases emitted from human
activities explain this warming trend." Humans are exacerbating the
"greenhouse effect."l 2 That is, human activities emit greenhouse gases,
which in turn trap heat in the atmosphere.' 3 "Gases that contribute to the
greenhouse effect include" water vapor, nitrous oxide, methane, and
carbon dioxide.14
Left unabated, climate change science indicates that greenhouse gas
emissions will continue to impact the climate in adverse and dramatic
ways.' 5 In fact, "[d]epending on future emissions of greenhouse gases
and how the climate responds, average global temperatures are projected
to increase worldwide by 2oF to 11.5 0 F by 21O0."" Climate change
scientists use climate models to demonstrate projected changes in
temperature, ocean level and acidity, precipitation, snow, and ice.1 7 These
models reveal troubling projections for the globe's future, including:
Warmer temperatures increase the frequency, intensity, and
duration of heat waves, which can pose health risks, particularly
for young children and the elderly.
Rising sea levels threaten coastal communities and ecosystems.
Changes in the patterns and amount of rainfall, as well as changes
in the timing and amount of stream flow, can affect water supplies
and water quality and the production of hydroelectricity.
Changing ecosystems influence geographic ranges of many plant
and animal species and the timing of their lifecycle events, such as
9. Seeid.at560-61.
10. Climate Change Science Overview, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/
overview.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
11. Id.
12. Global Climate Change, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2015). The "greenhouse effect" describes "warming that results when the atmosphere traps heat
radiating from Earth toward space." Id
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Climate Change Science Overview, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/
overview.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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migration and reproduction.
Increases in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events,
such as heat waves, droughts, and floods, can increase losses to
property, cause costly disruptions to society, and reduce the
availability and affordability of insurance.' 8
IV. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA

In Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
petitioners had standing to bring their challenge and concluded that the
EPA also had authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles.' 9 The case originated in the D.C. Circuit where
petitioners, consisting of twelve states, three cities, an American territory,
and a number of environmental organizations, sought to challenge the
EPA's denial of a petition requesting that the EPA regulate greenhouse
gases, including carbon dioxide, from new motor vehicles under the
Clean Air Act (CAA). 20 Respondent EPA and intervenors consisting of
ten states and several trade associations argued that the EPA "did not have
statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles and that, even if it did, it would not exercise the authority at this
time"21 due to the questioned accuracy of climate change models. 22
Although the EPA challenged the petitioners' standing, 23 the court
decided not to engage in an analysis of the adequacy of petitioners'
standing and instead "proceed[ed] to the merits with respect to EPA's
alternative decision not to regulate on the grounds, among others, that the
effect of greenhouse gases on climate is unclear and that models used to
predict climate change might not be accurate." 24
In deciding this issue, the circuit court discussed climate change
science. 25 Specifically, the court explained in detail how the entrapment
of energy by greenhouse gases in the atmosphere warms the planet,
"much like the glass panels of a greenhouse." 26 In fact, the court quoted
the EPA's own explanation of global warming. 2 7 Moreover, the EPA
18. Id.
19. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 498-501 (2007).
20. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
21. Id.
22. Id at 56.
23. Id at 54.
24. Id at 56.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. "The earth's surface is warmed by absorbing solar energy (visible light). The earth,
in turn, radiates infrared energy (heat) back into space. A portion of the infrared radiation is
trapped by greenhouse gas molecules, resulting in additional warming of the lower atmosphere
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employed climate change science to show uncertainty in the
understanding of climate change in order to support its position.2 8 The
EPA relied on the National Research Council's conclusions that global
cooling and warming occur in normal and regular cycles and that
increases in carbon dioxide levels are not necessarily associated with
increases in global temperatures. 29 For this reason, coupled with a myriad
of other policy concerns,3 0 the circuit court held that the EPA properly
exercised its discretion in denying the rulemaking petition.31
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit
court's decision. Before reaching the merits, the Court addressed the
petitioners' standing. The Court noted Massachusetts' special position for
standing purposes. 32 "States are not normal litigants for purposes of
invoking federal jurisdiction." 33 States have an interest in the preservation
of their sovereign territory. 34 In the instant case, Massachusetts owned
much of the territory "alleged to be affected" which "reinforce[d] the
conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently
concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power." 35 This quasisovereign interest, coupled with Congress's direction to the EPA to
protect Massachusetts, endowed Massachusetts with "special solicitude
in [the Court's] standing analysis." 36 The Court thus opined that the
EPA's rulemaking refusal presented an actual and imminent risk of harm
to Massachusetts and that the relief petitioners requested would likely
cause the EPA to alleviate that risk.37
In terms of the injury alleged, the Court found that rising seas
"swallow Massachusetts' coastal land" and "[b]ecause the
Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal property,

and the earth's surface." Id.
28. Id. at 57.
29. Id.
30. The Administrator argued that the following policy concerns "warranted regulatory
forbearance at this time": "New motor vehicles are but one of many sources of greenhouse gas

emissions; promulgating regulations under § 202 would 'result in an inefficient, piecemeal
approach to the climate change issue."' Additionally, "unilateral regulation of U.S. motor vehicle
emissions would weaken efforts to persuade developing countries to reduce the intensity of
greenhouse gases thrown off by their economies." Moreover, the Administrator noted that there

was already "[o]ngoing research into scientific uncertainties and the Administration's programs
to address climate change." Id. at 58.
31. Id.
32. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
33. Id.
34. Id at 519.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 520.
37. Id. at 521. "There is, moreover, a 'substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested' will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk." Id.
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. .. it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner." 38

Ever increasing global temperatures are likely to worsen this injury in the
future, resulting in remediation costs upwards of hundreds of millions of
dollars for Massachusetts. 39
Next, in analyzing the causation element of standing, the Court
refused to accept the EPA's argument that "greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles contributes so insignificantly to petitioners'
injuries that the Agency cannot be haled into federal court to answer for
them."4 0 Instead, the Court opined that even a small incremental step
could be attacked in federal court.4 1 After all, agencies often resolve
problems one step at a time, so a first tentative step should not preclude
federal jurisdiction.4 2 Furthermore, the Court found that a reduction in
emissions from new automobiles could not be considered a tentative or
incremental step anyway, because new domestic vehicles do contribute
meaningfully to greenhouse gas emissions and thus, to global warming. 43
Finally, the Court maintained that the redressability factor weighed in
favor of the petitioners.4 4 The fact that regulations aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from new domestic motor vehicles will not
alone reverse climate change does not preclude a finding that the EPA
still has a duty to regulate in such a way as to slow or reduce global
climate change.4 5 Because the risk of harm to Massachusetts from climate
change would be reduced if the EPA regulated emissions from new motor
vehicles, the relief sought by petitioners would alleviate the harm posed.4 6
Thus, according to the Court, Massachusetts had standing to bring a
challenge to the EPA's refusal of petitioners' rulemaking petition. 47
Moving to the merits, the Court had to first determine "whether §
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles in the event that it forms a 'judgment'
that such emissions contribute to climate change." 48 The Court began by
examining the drafters' intent for and the language of § 202(a)(1) of the
Clean Air Act, which provides that
The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from
time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 522 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 523.
Id.
Id at 524.

42.

Id

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id at 525.
Id
Id
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id at 528.
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section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant
from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare ....
"The Act defines 'air pollutant' to include 'any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological,
radioactive .

.

. substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise

enters the ambient air."'50 The EPA claimed that climate change had a
unique political history and because of its importance, Congress would
have spoken to its regulation with "exacting specificity" if Congress had
wanted the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.5 1 As such, the
EPA argued that "air pollutants," as defined in the Clean Air Act, could
not have included greenhouse gases. 52 Moreover, the EPA
bolstered this conclusion by explaining that if carbon dioxide were
an air pollutant, the only feasible method of reducing tailpipe
emissions would be to improve fuel economy. But because
Congress has already created detailed mandatory fuel economy
standards subject to Department of Transportation (DOT)
administration, the Agency concluded that EPA regulation would
either conflict with those standards or be superfluous.5 3
The Court found this argument unavailing. Instead, the Court
interpreted "any air pollutant" to include substances emitted into the air
and thus held that, because greenhouse gases are substances emitted into
the air, § 202(a)(1) embraced greenhouse gases as pollutants for which
the section covered.54 As such, the Court held that the EPA had the
"statutory authority" to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles. 5
Next, the Court considered the EPA's argument that even if the EPA
did have the authority, exercising that authority would be unwise. 56
However, the EPA's long list of reasons for refraining from regulating
did not comply with the statutory mandate of the Clean Air Act that the
"EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id at 506.
Id.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id at 528-29.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 532-33.
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greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides
some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its
discretion to determine whether they do." 57 Instead, the EPA's policy
judgment arguments had no relevance to whether "greenhouse gas
emissions contribute to climate change." 58 Because the EPA failed to
offer an acceptable explanation for its refusal of the rulemaking petition,
the EPA's refusal was "arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in

accordance with law." 59 Having established that petitioners had standing
to bring their challenge, that the EPA had statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles, and that the EPA's
refusal to do so was arbitrary, the Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remanded the case. 60
Climate change science played an important factual and legal role in
the Supreme Court's decision. The majority began its opinion by
documenting the relation between rising global temperatures and "a
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere." 6 1 The Court cited to the science behind climate change
when it made note of the changes in the concentrations of carbon
dioxide. 62 Moreover, the Court discussed the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC)'S 63 scientific findings 64 as well as those findings
by climate scientist Michael MacCracken. 65 The MacCracken Report's
findings on the effect climate change would have on sea level rise was
used to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury to the plaintiffs,
which helped those plaintiffs to establish their Article III standing. 66 The
court also employed climate change science to confirm the plaintiffs
57. Id. at 533.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 534-35.
61. Id at 504-05. "Respected scientists believe the two trends are related." Id. at 505.
62. Id. at 507. For example, "[i]n 1959, shortly after the U.S. Weather Bureau began
monitoring atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, an observatory in Mauna Loa, Hawaii, recorded a
mean level of 316 parts per million. This was well above the highest carbon dioxide concentration
- no more than 300 parts per million - revealed in the 420,000-year-old ice-core record. By the
time Congress drafted § 202(a)(1) in 1970, carbon dioxide levels had reached 325 parts per
million." Id.
63. The IPCC is "a multinational scientific body organized under the auspices of the United
Nations." Id at 508.
64. The IPCC published its first "comprehensive report" on climate change in 1990, which
stated "emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric
concentrations of . .. greenhouse gases [which] will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on
average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface." Id. at 508-09 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
65. The MacCracken report demonstrated global warming threatens, among other things,

sea level rise, changes to ecosystems, and spread of disease. Id at 521-22.
66. Id. at 521-23.
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could meet the second factor in establishing standing, causation. 6 7 That
is, the court attributes climate change to human activities, as the scientists
involved in the cited reports did, to find that motor-vehicle emissions do
contribute meaningfully to greenhouse gas emissions and thus global
warming.68

Climate change science permeated the strategic decisions made by
counsel for petitioners. For example, according to Lisa Heinzerling,
lawyers for the petitioners had to decide "whether to call the problem at
issue 'global warming' or 'climate change."' 69 Heinzerling explained that
the term "climate change," as opposed to "global warming" "might seem
less inflammatory to Justices hostile to the very notion of human-induced
warming." 70 Interestingly, both the majority and the dissenters used the
term "global warming"-the majority to explain the science, and the
dissenters to explain the deficiencies in the science. 1
V. WASHINGTON ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL V. BELLON

Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon originated in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington as
Washington Environmental Council v. Sturdevant.72 In Washington
Environmental Council, the plaintiffs, Washington Environmental
Council (WEC) and the Sierra Club Washington State Chapter (Sierra
Club), brought suit against the directors of several environmental
agencies.7 ' The defendants, Ted Sturdevant, Mark Asmundson, and Craig
T. Kenworthy directed the Washington State Department of Ecology, the
Northwest Clean Air Agency, and the Puget Sound Clean Air Agency
respectively. 4 The plaintiffs brought their suit under the Clean Air Act
(CAA) and based their case on administrative law.75
In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought to "compel state and regional
agencies . . . responsible for protecting air quality and climate in

Washington to comply with federally-enforceable mandates to control
greenhouse gas emissions from oil refineries" "to protect the residents
and the natural environment of Washington state from the harmful effects
67. Id. at 525.
68. Id
69. Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. 1, 16-17 (2008).
70. Id.
71. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505, 521-22, 525, 535-47 (2007).
72. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
73. Id. at 1211.
74. Id.
75. The higher court case was also based on federal constitutional law, as the substance of
that decision was an analysis of the elements of Article Ill standing. Wash. Envtl. Council v.
Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013).
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of greenhouse gas emissions."76 The plaintiffs targeted five oil refineries
operating in Washington, BP Cherry Point, ConocoPhillips, Shell Oil,
Tesoro, and U.S. Oil in their suit to force compliance with CAA
regulations.7 7 As such, the Western States Petroleum Association
(WSPA), a non-profit trade association whose members included the
owners and operators of the five oil refineries, intervened in the suit to
78
join the directors of the environmental agencies as defendants.
The lower court began its opinion with background information on
Washington's State Implementation Plan (SIP), "adopted pursuant to the"
CAA. 79 "Under the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
establishes national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for 'criteria
pollutants.' 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a). Then, each state must propose a SIP that
sets emissions limits, control measures, and schedules for attaining and/or
maintaining NAAQS compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)." 80 The two
sections of Washington's SIP at issue in the case were the RACT
provision and the Narrative Standard.8 ' According to the RACT
provision, "emissions units are required to use reasonably available
control technology (RACT)" 82 and according to the Narrative Standard,
"[n]o person shall cause or allow the emissions of any air contaminant
from any source if it is detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of any
person, or causes damage to property or business."83 Although "[t]he
EPA has not established NAAQS for GHGs," Washington includes
GHGs in its definition of air pollutants, and because the five oil refineries
were emission units of GHGs, the plaintiffs brought their suit to demand
defendants "establish RACTs for GHG emissions from oil refineries." 84
Conversely, the defendants argued "(1) Washington's SIP provisions
d[id] not require [the] [a]gencies establish RACT emissions for GHG
emissions and (2) even if Washington's SIP was interpreted to impose an
obligation on the [a]gencies, the CAA preclude[d] Washington SIP from
regulating beyond NAAQS.""
The court granted "Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to its
claim under the RACT provision" 86 and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim
76. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Wash. Envtl. Council v.
Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No. I I-cv-00417).
77. Id. at 1211.
78. Motion to Intervene by Western States Petroleum Association at 2, Wash. Envtl.
Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No. I1 -cv-00417).
79. Id. at 1211.
80. Id
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1211-12.
85. Id. at 1212.
86. Id. at 1219.
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under the Narrative Standard. 7 Additionally, while the defendants sought
to strike several exhibits proffered by the plaintiffs and the standing
declarations, the court only struck the exhibits.8 ' The court held that the
RACT provision did require agencies to establish GHG emissions.89 In
reaching its holding, the court analyzed the statutory language of the
RACT provision.9 0 The court also held that the Narrative Standard was
not enforceable as a citizen suit because the provision granted broad
discretion to the environmental agency defendants for the provision's
enforcement. 9 1 Here too, the court analyzed the.statutory language of the
provision at issue.92 Finally, the court disagreed with the defendants and
held that the CAA did not preclude the Washington SIP from regulating
beyond NAAQS. The provisions of Washington's SIP that regulated
GHGs were federally enforceable. 94 As before, the court engaged in
statutory interpretation in reaching its holding.9 5 The court also analyzed
the EPA's interpretation of the CAA. 96 Noticeably absent in the court's
opinion was any mention of climate change science. The court never
discussed the impact of GHGs on the climate nor did the court even
discuss the changing climate.
Despite this absence in the court opinion, the plaintiffs offered a
glimpse into the role climate change science would play in the case in the
second paragraph of their complaint. In this paragraph, the plaintiffs
indicated that greenhouse gas emissions affect global and local climate.9 8
The plaintiffs went on to explain this effect in their statement of the case
section. 99 The plaintiffs indicated that climate-related impacts of GHG
emissions in Washington included "rising sea levels, coastal flooding,
acidification of marine waters, declines in shellfish production, impacts
to snow pack and water supplies, agricultural impacts on the east side of
the Cascades, and changes in forest fires." 00 Because of the combustion
and refining processes, as well as leaks, storage tanks, and other sources,
plaintiffs opined that the five oil refineries were "responsible for a
87. Id. at 1220.
88. Id. at 1219.
89. Id. at 1212.
90. Id. at 1213-14.
91. Id at 1215.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1217.
95. Id. at 1215-16.
96. See id. at 1217-19.
97. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Wash. Envtl. Council v.
Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No. I 1-cv-00417).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 6-9.
100. Id. at 6.
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significant portion of the total greenhouse gas emissions in
Washington"o'0 and would thus be responsible for causing and
exacerbating climate change impacts.1 0 2
In their answers, defendants Asmundson, Kenworthy, and Sturdevant
denied that the plaintiffs had a cause of action under the federal Clean Air
Act and denied that the lawsuit would protect Washingtonians from the
harmful effects of greenhouse gas emissions.'o3 However, the defendants
did admit to the climate change science present in the complaint.' 04 In
fact, the defendants admitted that greenhouse gas emissions on
Washington would adversely affect the climate.' 0 5 Thus, the defendants
did not deny the truth of climate change science. However, defendantintervenor Western States Petroleum Association answered that it was
without knowledge as to the parts of plaintiffs' complaint delving into the
science and therefore denied those science-related allegations. 06
On appeal, a unanimous Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked
Article III standing.i07 Accordingly, the court "vacate[d] the district
court's order on the parties' dispositive motions and remand[ed] with
instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction."o108
The Ninth Circuit first "review[ed] de novo the district court's
assumption of jurisdiction."' 09 In conducting its standing analysis, the
court first assumed that WEC and Sierra Club members' declarations
"provided "specific facts" . . . of immediate and concrete injuries."' 10 The

members asserted "specific aesthetic and recreational injuries" including
property damage from climate change-induced flooding and wildfires
and diminished availability of recreational activities due to changes in
101. Id. at 6-7.
102. Id. at 6.
103.

See Northwest Clean Air Agency's Answer to Complaint for Declaratory& Injunctive

Relief at 1-2, Wash. Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No.
I1-cv-00417); Answer of Defendant Ted Sturdevant, Director, Washington State Department of
Ecology at 2, Wash. Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No.
I 1-cv-00417).
104. See Northwest Clean Air Agency's Answer to Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive
Relief at 4, Wash. Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No.
I I-cv-00417).
105. See id; Answer of Defendant Puget Sound Clean Air Agency at 4, Wash. Envtl.
Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No. 1 l-cv-00417); Answer of
Defendant Ted Sturdevant, Director, Washington State Department of Ecology at 4, Wash. Envtl.
Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No. I 1-cv-00417).
106.

See Answer of Intervenor-Defendant Western States Petroleum Association at 3, Wash.

Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (No. 1 I-cv-00417).
107. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013).
10 8. Id.
109. Id. at 1138.
110. Id.atll4l.
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wildlife habitat and glacier size. 1 1 Moreover, the plaintiffs' members
also asserted, "that their or their family's health has been negatively
affected by climate changes."I1 2 Assuming these declarations as true, the
court held that the plaintiffs "satisfied the first prong" for establishing
standing.'' 3
However, the plaintiffs did not fare as well under the causality and
redressability prongs.1 4 First, the court agreed with WSPA that the chain
of causation from the plaintiffs' asserted injuries to the defendants'
failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the five oil refineries
was too attenuated to show causality.' 15 Here the court wanted to see a
scientific or evidentiary basis for the plaintiffs' claim that their injuries
were caused specifically by the oil refineries' greenhouse gas
emissions. 116 Thus, the court actually requested climate change science
be employed by the plaintiffs. Instead of being a climate change science
denier, the court wanted to employ science to make its decision. At the
same time, however, the court's refusal to find a causal link between the
plaintiffs' injuries and the defendants' alleged wrongs demonstrates that
the court was unwilling to depend on the plaintiffs' science. The court
defined plaintiffs' science 1 7 as "vague, conclusory statements."" 8 Thus,
the court was not only receptive to climate change science in the causality
context, but also expected that the science come from scientists, and not
from the bare assertions of affected plaintiffs. The court maintained that
a myriad of parties caused the climate change that resulted in the
plaintiffs' injuries,
making "the causal chain too tenuous to support
9
standing."l
The plaintiffs countered that causality should be inferred in the instant
case because the plaintiffs sought "to enforce a specific regulatory
obligation." Citing to NRDC,1 20 the plaintiffs tried to argue that a causal
connection between "adverse environmental effects" and the "Agencies'
failure to set RACT standards" could be inferred because the RACT
111. Id. at 1140-41.
112. Id. at 1141.
113. Id
114. See id at 1141-47.
115. Id. at 1141.
116. Id. at 1142.
117. "[T]he failure of the Agencies to take the actions described. . . will result in additional
greenhouse gas emissions in Washington State that will exacerbate changes to the regional and
global climates." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1144.
120. "In NRDC, we observed in the context of the Clean Water Act that '[w]here Congress
has expressed the need for specific regulations relating to the environment, that expression

supports an inference that there is a causal connection between the lack of those regulations and
adverse environmental effects."' Id. at 1144 (emphasis in original).
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provision applies to greenhouse gas emissions. 121 However, the court
found this argument unavailing.1 22 Instead, the court ruled that a general
environmental injury could not suffice to demonstrate causality.1 23
Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that the Ninth Circuit should extend
the holding of Massachusettsto the instant case. 124 In Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court "relaxed the standing requirement for Massachusetts"
because "Massachusetts was exercising a procedural right to challenge
the rejection of its rulemaking petition, which permitted it to assert that
right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy" and because of Massachusetts' special position as a
sovereign state.' 25 As neither factor was implicated in the instant case,
and the oil refineries' emissions were not as meaningful as those
emissions involved in Massachusetts, the court refused to extend
Massachusetts'holding and instead maintained that the plaintiffs did not
satisfy the causality prong needed to establish standing.' 2 6
Finally, "for many of the same reasons [the plaintiffs] fail[ed] to meet
the causality requirement," the court held that the plaintiffs also failed to
satisfy the redressability prong. 127 The plaintiffs could not show that
RACT standards would reduce the oil refineries' emissions of greenhouse
gases.1 28 Nor could the plaintiffs demonstrate that RACT standards
would reduce the emissions responsible for the plaintiffs' asserted
injuries.1 29 The court opined that plaintiffs would continue to suffer their
injuries regardless of reductions in emissions from the Washington oil
refineries.' 3 0 As such, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the redessability
prong.
Unlike the lower court, which ignored climate change science, the
Ninth Circuit employed, discussed, and endorsed climate change science.
The court began its opinion by orienting readers to the "greenhouse
effect" and how greenhouse gases trap heat in the atmosphere.' 3 ' The
court then "assume[d] for the purposes of [its] opinion that global
temperatures have increased over the past fifty years and that greenhouse
gases are contributing to global climate change." 32 As alluded to above,
the court then relied on climate change science in its standing analysis.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id
See id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 1145-46.
Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id. at 1146-47.
Id at 1147.
Id.atll35.
Id at 1135-36.
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The court cited the science and contended that greenhouse gas emissions
did cause climate change that in turn caused the plaintiffs' injuries.' 33 The
problem for the plaintiffs was that no amount of science could
demonstrate that it was these specific oil refineries' specific greenhouse
gas emissions that caused the plaintiffs' injuries.' 3 4
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit tended to endorse the findings by
climate change scientists. For example, in its discussion of causality, the
court "assume[d] without deciding that man-made sources of GHG
emissions are causally linked to global warming and detrimental to
climate change."' 3 5 Perhaps this assumption worked against the
plaintiffs' interest, because it allowed the court to attribute many actors
to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere,
making the chain of causation increasingly attenuated and difficult for the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that these defendants in particular were
responsible for the plaintiffs' asserted injuries.
However the court, to some extent, questioned the science in the
causality context. For example, the court opined, "there is limited
scientific capability in assessing, detecting, or measuring the relationship
between a certain GHG emission source and localized climate impacts in
a given region."l 36 Quoting the U.S. Geological Survey, the court noted
that "[i]t is currently beyond the scope of existing science to identify a
specific source of C02 emissions and designate it as the cause of specific
climate impacts at an exact location." 37 Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not
deny or challenge the science, but instead determined that the science has
not advanced enough to pinpoint a specific source of a specific
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases. In fact, the court drew
attention to the fact that the plaintiffs did not challenge the WSPA's
expert who declared that
it is not possible to quantify a causal link, in any generally accepted
scientific way, between GHG emissions from any single oil
refinery in Washington, or the collective emissions of all five oil
refineries located in Washington, and direct, indirect or cumulative
effects on global climate change in Washington or anywhere
else.' 38

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at I142-43.
Id at 1143-44.
Id at 1142.
Id. at 1143.
Id.
Id.
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VI. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE IMPLICATIONS

As demonstrated by Massachusetts v. EPA and Washington
Environmental Council v. Bellon, courts most often rely on climate
change science in the context of standing. In fact, the lower court in
Washington Environmental Council never addressed climate change
science, because the court's decision at that level focused on
administrative law and statutory interpretation.1 39 However, at the
appellate level, the Ninth Circuit relied substantially on.the science to
find that the plaintiffs did not have standing. 4 0 Moreover, the Court in
Massachusetts focused on standing and engaged in a science-focused
standing analysis.141 In the context of standing, climate change science
determines whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury and whether that
injury can be attributed to that particular defendant in the case. Climate
change science also comes into play in determining whether the redress
requested of the court by the plaintiff would in fact alleviate the plaintiffs
alleged injury.
Climate change-related litigation is not the only area of law in which
science plays a critical role. Courts must often employ science in
rendering their decisions. For example, in criminal cases, courts are often
asked to consider DNA tests and in tort suits, jurors may be asked to
consider the expert testimony of scientists and doctors. In fact, one law
professor has argued that because "both law and science today are
significant forces that must coexist", "lawyers must be conversant in the
language of science and . .. comfortable in its culture. This is not to say
that lawyers must be scientists, but they cannot hope to evaluate legal and
political policy without such understandings." 42
Yet, unlike the science employed in run-of-the-mill pollution or
medical malpractice cases, climate change science is highly
politicized.1 4 3 The distribution of Justices in the Massachusetts case
offers an example of this politicization.1 44 Moreover, "climate skeptics
have done . . . a good job politicizing the science at the heart of the

139. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1212 (W.D. Wash.
2011).
140. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1143-44, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2013).
141. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
142. Steven M. Richman, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law, by
David L. Faigman, N.J. LAW. MAG., Feb. 2000, at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See Joel Achenbach & Juliet Eilperin, Climate-ChangeScience Makesfor Hot Politics,
WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/climatechange-science-makes-for-hot-politics/2011/08/18/gIQA 1eZJQJ story.html.
144. The majority in Massachusetts was made up of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent was made up of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2007).
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issue."1 45 It is therefore especially important that courts move away from
the political haze that has enveloped climate change litigation and instead
rely on their "sophisticated procedural standards in order to determine the
validity of expert testimony."' 4 6 Despite the Intergovernmental Panel of
Climate Change's (IPCC) proclamation that "[s]cientific evidence for
warming of the climate system is unequivocal,"l 47 it seems that not all
parties are on board.1 48
Furthermore, climate change deniers cast doubt on the science. 149 For
example, several trade organizations
created the Information Council on the Environment (ICE). ICE
hired a public relations firm to conduct a campaign to cast doubt
on climate change science. The organization hired spokespeople
with scientific expertise in areas other than climatology to lend
legitimacy to their campaign. ICE attempted to spin the increase in
atmospheric carbon dioxide as beneficial to plant life and even
went so far as to make a documentary film that was widely
distributed to universities on the subject." 0
Other organizations "astroturf" to cast doubt on the science.15 1
"Astroturfing ... describe[s] the tactic where established special interests
organize a campaign to create the appearance of a grassroots
movement." 52 These organizations then use the pseudo-grassroots
movements to "spread misinformation about climate change science
without raising suspicions." 53 This misinformation comes from the fossil
fuel industry's "reconstructions of other researchers' datasets", editorials
and petitions, including
the Oregon Institute's petition of 34,000 scientists who believe
climate change is not anthropogenic. The petition was designed to
undermine the scientific consensus in support of anthropogenic
warming. It created the impression of a debate without raising any
issues or even presenting the credentials of its signatories. A
145.

Elizabeth Dubats, An Inconvenient Lie: Big Tobacco Was Put on Trialfor Denying the

Effects of Smoking; Is Climate Change Denial Off-Limits?, 7 Nw. J. L. & Soc. PoL'Y 510, 513
(2012).
146. Id
147.

Climate Change: How do we know?, NASA, http://climate. nasa.gov/evidence/ (last

visited Feb. 28, 2015).
148.
149.

See supra note 143.
Dubats, supra note 145, at 518.

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 519.
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random sampling of thirty signatories later revealed that, of the
signatories that would return calls, eleven still agreed with the
petition, six would not sign it knowing what they know now, and
three do not remember signing anything to that effect.1 54
These scientific misrepresentations converge with the political
battlefield. For example, one reconstructed study, conducted by a retired
mining executive and an economist, suggested that the shape of the graph
charting climate change since 1400 from the original study
was a product of error and unjustified manipulation of the source
data. Politicians quickly picked up the study, and it triggered a
Senate hearing on the subject where Senator Inhofe declared global
warming to be "the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American
people." Meanwhile, despite the sound and fury, the results of the
original study have been affirmed by the U.S. National Academy
of Sciences. This episode illustrates just how easily politics can
manipulate the public discourse on scientific issues.'5
Considering the role that science plays in climate change-related
litigation, courts will have to rely on that science in reaching decisions.
The law and the science in this context "must coexist."l5 6 In oral
argument for Massachusetts, Justice Scalia proclaimed "I told you before
I'm not a scientist ..

..

That's why I don't want to have to deal with

global warming, to tell you the truth."' 5 7 Yet moving forward, the
Supreme Court Justices, State Supreme Court Justices, and judges at the
district court and appellate levels will have to borrow from the science to
assemble the law.
VII. STANDING IMPLICATIONS

As demonstrated by Massachusetts v. EPA and Washington
Environmental Council v. Bellon, standing is a point of contention in
climate change-related litigation between injured plaintiffs and
defendants allegedly responsible for the injuries. While plaintiffs may be
able to establish a concrete and particularized injury, the plaintiffs in
climate change cases often struggle to establish causality and

154. Id.
155. Id. at 519-20.
156. Richman, supra note 142, at 47.
157. See Dubats, supra note 145, at 510 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 23:1-5,
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120)).
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redressability because climate change is a global phenomenon.' That is,
plaintiffs cannot establish that it was the defendant's emissions
specifically which resulted in the plaintiffs' harm. Even if plaintiffs could
demonstrate this causal link, so many other independent parties
contribute to greenhouse gas emissions that the plaintiffs' requested
redress would not prevent or correct plaintiffs' injuries.
Yet in the realm of climate change, even incremental changes can
make a huge difference. Thus, courts thwart progress when they fail to
recognize standing in climate change litigation. For example, Washington
Environmental Council seems to suggest that because there are so many
contributors of greenhouse gas emissions, no one emitter can be held
responsible. There are too many inputs in the causal chain. The court
recognized the harm that greenhouse gas emissions caused the plaintiffs
and the environment generally. However, the court concluded that
plaintiffs' injuries would continue unabated even if the oil refineries had
controls on their emissions. The court also mentions a "meaningful
contribution" standard in which a defendant must contribute at least a
meaningful concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in order for a
court to find a causal connection between the defendant's action and the
plaintiffs injury.' 59 This suggests that the more emissions, the more
likely companies and individuals are to continue emitting greenhouse
gases. In fact, polluters are encouraged to pollute more. This scheme
dissuades individuals from making reductions in their greenhouse gas
emissions.
The Massachusetts Court's holding, in contrast, encourages
individuals to make reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions.
Although greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are global
problems, the Court refused to let this global nature act as an insurance
policy protecting greenhouse gas emitters from liability. 60 In
Massachusetts, the Court held that the petitioners, twelve states, three
cities, an American territory, and a number of environmental
organizations, had "standing to challenge EPA's denial of their
rulemaking petition."' 61 Despite the myriad of sources of greenhouse
gases and contributors to climate change, the Court held that the
petitioners were still entitled to the redress they sought.1 62 The Court
reasoned that the risk of harm to the petitioners from the EPA's failure to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles "would be
reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they [sought]."' 63
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1143-44, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1145-46.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 526.
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Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts was friendlier
towards climate change redress. In fact, the Court opined that tentative
steps within a massive problem should still garner standing.' 64 In doing
so, the Court effectively held emitters accountable and refused to let
emissions become part of a "tragedy-of-the-commons" type-scenario.1 6 5
If courts in the future follow the Massachusetts reasoning for causality
and redressability, climate change litigation could become the next masstort area. That is, plaintiffs frustrated by their perception that Congress is
not doing enough to combat climate change, may turn to the courts by
bringing tort suits to effectively force judicial regulation of climate
change.1 66 Because we are all responsible for emitting greenhouse gases,
some scholars worry that recognition of tort liability in climate change
litigation could leave us all vulnerable to lawsuits.' 6 7
This would not be the first time "faux legislation"l 6 8 or "public
interest tort litigation"' 69 is used to force judicial regulation where
congressional regulation falls short. Beginning in the mid-1990s, states
brought mass tort suits against tobacco manufacturers.1 70 "[S]tate
attorneys general and their partners, a small group of plaintiffs' attorneys
specializing in mass products tort, consciously viewed these lawsuits as
filling the void left by the political branches' abdication of regulatory
responsibility." 7' Plaintiffs also brought similar suits against
manufactures of handguns and lead pigment.1 72
The challenges climate change litigation plaintiffs face in establishing
standing and the implications of either failing to establish or satisfying
164. Id at 524.
165. The Tragedy of the Commons is an article written by Garrett Hardin in which he
explains that each person who has access to a "commons" is guided by his own self-interest. In
the context of a common pasture and sheep herders, for example, each sheep herder will graze as

many sheep as benefit his own self-interest, even if this means that combined with other sheep
herders, the grazing will overload the common pasture. "Even when herdsmen understand the
long-run consequences of their actions, they generally are powerless to prevent such damage
without some coercive means of controlling the actions of each individual." Garrett Hardin,
Tragedy of the Commons, LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/

TragedyoftheCommons.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
166. See Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts:
ReinvigoratingJudicialRestraintDoctrines, 62 S.C. L. REv. 201, 202 (2010).

167.
168.

See id at 203.
Id. at202. Former Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, coined the term "faux legislation"

to describe "the federal government's efforts to sue manufacturers of cigarettes and handguns

when a deadlocked Congress refused to regulate tobacco 'death sticks' and weapons that teenage
boys used 'to shoot up high schools."' Id.
169. Id at 204. Whereby plaintiffs try "to establish government policy through litigation."
Id.

170.
171.
172.

Id. at 203.
Id. at 203-04.
Id at 212.
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the three prongs of standing mirror those challenges and implications
common to tobacco litigation. "In fact, comparisons have been drawn
between tobacco litigation and litigation against the petroleum
industry."l7 3 For example,
both types of cases involve complex chains of causation with many
potential contributing factors and both require a judge to referee a
battle of expert witnesses and to ultimately determine where the
weight of the evidence falls. The question that remains is why
courts were ready to confront scientific complexity in the case of
tobacco's link to cancer and other disease, but continue to find
climate change too daunting to confront on the merits.
While tobacco litigants struggled for decades to win a case based
on tobacco's connection to cancer, the complex causal chain
between exposure to tobacco smoke and disease did not prove to
be an insurmountable barrier to adjudication. Yet the complex
causal chain between greenhouse gas emissions and climate
change-related injuries, such as severe weather and sea-level rise,
has. 174
The scientific analysis required for a causality determination relates
back to the earlier discussion of climate change science. Thus, science
and standing converge in climate change litigation. Moreover, one author
suggests that borrowing the fraud action from tobacco litigation and
framing climate change litigation as a fraud action might make it easier
for plaintiffs to establish standing. 7 1
Climate change cases "are no different from any other case with
complex questions of proximate cause." 1 76 Once courts more readily
accept this proposition, courts will be more apt to find that plaintiffs do
have standing to bring suits under a climate change-related theory. Thus,
plaintiffs might soon be able to regularly employ judicial regulation to
curb emissions of greenhouse gases, just as plaintiffs once employed
judicial regulation to curb tobacco use. 177 While such a scenario
anticipates much needed action and beneficial implications for the
climate, mass-tort climate change litigation could leave any greenhouse
gas emitter open to liability for climate change. 7 8 Ultimately, it will be
standing-and specifically the causality and redressability prongs-that
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Dubats, supra note 145, at 512.
Id. at 512, 527.
See id at 526.
Id at 511.
See Gifford, supra note 166, at 202.
See id at 203.
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will determine who can be held liable and what her responsibility for
redressing climate change will be.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Courts most often rely on climate change science in deciding whether
a plaintiff has standing to bring a climate change-related action. However,
the science in the climate change litigation context is highly politicized
and climate change deniers continue to promulgate misinformation
campaigns. As the climate warms and sea levels continue to rise, courts
will have to employ science to inform the law in this area. Thus,
understanding the political undertones of climate science is crucial. This
reliance on science to inform the law should allow courts to find that more
plaintiffs can establish standing. This is critical ifjudicial regulation is to
be employed to redress the ill effects of greenhouse gas emissions and
climate change. In the climate change context, small steps can combine
to lead to leaps and bounds in correcting decades of climate abuse. When
courts refuse to recognize standing because climate change is a global
phenomenon with a myriad of contributors and inputs, courts thwart the
possibility of progress. Yet, as the Court in Massachusetts orated, "[a]
reduction in domestic emissions [from new motor vehicles] would slow
the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happened
elsewhere" such as in China or India.1 79

179.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007).
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